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BANKS AND BANKING: CONFLICT IN FEDERAL COURTS
AS TO THE EXTENT STATE LAW STANDARDS CONTROL
IN ESTABLISHING NATIONAL BANK BRANCHES
SECTION 36 (c) (1) of the National Bank Act permits a national bank
to establish branches within the city of the parent bank "if such
establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to
State banks by the law of the State."1  The quoted clause is also
contained in section 36 (c) (2) which authorizes the establishment of
national branches at any point in the state, expressly subject, how-
ever, to those restrictions on location which are imposed on state
banks by state law.2 In separate cases involving the establishment of
national branch banks within the city of the parent bank, two federal
district courts have expressed conflicting views as to the effect of state
law limitations upon national branch banking.
Both decisions involved the law of Utah, which forbids branches
for its state banks in cities with at least one bank unless the branch
would take over an existing bank.3 In each case, the Comptroller of
the Currency had authorized a national bank to establish a branch in
the city of its principal office, even though it would not be taking
over an existing bank. In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon,4 a
'McFadden Act § 7 (c), 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (c) (1) (1958).
248 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (c) (2) (1958).
The authority of Congress to establish and regulate national banks derives from
powers delegated by U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 315, 406 (1819). State law cannot regulate national banks except to the extent
that Congress permits. Mercantile Nat'1 Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558-59 (1963);
Van Reed v. People's Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 554, 557 (1905); Davis v. Elmira Savings
Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1963). This limitation is not applicable to cities
of the first class, which are those having at least 90,000 inhabitants. Ibid.; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 10-1-1 (1953).
For Utah's definition of "existing bank," see note 4 infra.
'234 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Utah 1964). Although there were branches of nonlocal
banks, the national bank was the only unit bank in the city of Logan. The branches
did not qualify under Utah law as banks already existing in that city, but the national
bank itself qualified; hence state law required the proposed branch to take over an
existing bank. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 236-37, 390 P.2d
592, 594-95 (1964).
The parent of one of the branches in Logan brought a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding to determine whether the Comptroller of the Currency had violated his
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federal district court in Utah held that once a state has expressly
authorized branch banking, the precise limitations imposed on state
banks are inapplicable to national banks seeking to establish branch-
es within the city of the principal office. Three months later, a fed-
eral district court in the District of Columbia held in Commercial
Security Bank v. Saxon5 that since a state bank could not establish a
branch without taking over an existing bank, the National Bank Act
incorporated the same state law limitation for national banks.
Walker reasoned that the first two subdivisions of section 36 (c)
were designed to fulfill separate purposes and should be accorded
independent legal significance.6 Therefore, once the state legisla-
ture has expressly authorized branch banking, a national bank may
establish a branch within its city without regard to specific state
requirements.7 Commercial Security, on the other hand, insists that
the common purpose of both subdivisions was to establish competi-
tive equality between national and state banks, requiring that the
provisions be read in pari materia.8 The most effective means of
achieving equality within the dual banking system would be to make
state law the standard in every situation.9
authority under the National Bank Act. Plaintiff-bank's standing to challenge the
Comptroller's decision had been firmly established in earlier decisions. National
Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830
(1958). At one time it was thought that the complainant bank had to institute suit
before the Comptroller had issued the certificate of authorization. Commercial State
Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1959), afl'd, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cr. 1960).
See Bell, Branches of National Banks-Recent Cases on Review of Decisions of Comp-
troller of the Currency, 16 Bus. LAW. 386, 387 (1961). However, it was subsequently
held that an action could be maintained even after the branch was conducting business.
Union Savings Bank v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964), affirming 209 F. Supp. 319
(D.D.C. 1962).
' 236 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1964). The proposed branch was to be in the city of
Ogden where four principal bank offices and two branches already existed.
6 234 F. Supp. at 78 & n.9. Specific language makes state restrictions on location a
requirement for branches outside the city of the main office. See text accompanying
note 2 supra. Such language is not used with reference to branches within the bank's
principal city. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
7Although Walker is apparently a case of first impression, other cases have inter-
preted § 36 (c) as not binding national banks absolutely to requirements and definitions
of state law. See Union Savings Bank v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964), affirming
209 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1962) (state definition of "village" not controlling), Rushton
v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 299 N.W. 129 (1941) (approval of state com-
missioner unnecessary). Compare Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962), which failed to refer to state law in defining
a "branch bank" as opposed to a new bank.
11236 F. Supp. at 461. See Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770, 774
(D.D.C. 1959) (dictum), aff'd, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
' See South Dakota v. National Bank, 219 F. Supp. 842, 846 (D.S.D. 1963); cf. 38
TuL L. REv. 162, 165 (1963).
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The National Bank Act originally contained no mention of bank
branches, 10 and the Supreme Court interpreted this silence to mean
that national banks were precluded from having branch offices. 1
Consequently, in a state which allowed branches for its banks it was
considered more advantageous to stay out of the national system. 12
The McFadden Act of 1927,1" which constitutes the substance of the
present section 36 (c) (1), was intended to make national banking
more attractive.14 The committee reports accompanying this bill,
however, did not indicate whether the limited extension contem-
plated therein was to require merely a general state branching au-
thorization, or if express state law limitations would be also incor-
porated into section 36 (c) (1).15
As this act restricted national branches to the cities of the bank's
main office, some felt that Congress had not done enough."0 In 1932,
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency offered an amend-
ment which would have allowed state-wide branching unfettered by
state law.'7  Opposition to this proposal 8 resulted in the submission
of two amendments authorizing state-wide branches only in states
where such branching was permitted for state banks 9 and according
to the exact location restrictions imposed by the state statute.20
lo RV. STAT. § 5190 (2d ed. 1878). See WEsrERFIELD, HIsToRwcAL SURVEY OF BRANCH
BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1939).
I" First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924).
12 Congress was aware of the competitive inequality that worked against national
banks and recognized its duty to remedy the situation. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th
Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1963).
13 McFadden Act § 7 (c), 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (c) (1)
(1958).
"See Comment, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 148, 159 (1964); Comment, 8 VILL. L. REv. 209,
214 (1963) (Congress was anxious to halt the growing conversion of national banks to
state banks); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1093-94 (1957).
r The committee reports are susceptible to conflicting inferences. Compare H.R.
REP. No. 83, supra note 12, at 4, with S. REP. No. 473, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1926).
Walker construed both reports to be consistent with its decision, 234 F. Supp. at 78
n.1l, but certain language in the Senate Report implied that national branching within
a city would be prohibited whenever state banks could not have branches within that
city.
1 See Comment, 8 VILL. L. REv. 209, 215 (1963).
7 S. RE,. No. 584, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1932).
" The only articulated reason for the opposition was a concern for infringing upon
the states' sovereign prerogative. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text.
0 76 CONG. REc. 2079 (1933) (amendment offered by Senator Bratton).
20 Ibid. (amendment offered by Senator Blaine). Senator Bratton stated that this
proposal did not conflict with his amendment. Ibid. The Blaine amendment was the
only proposal which would have clarified the uncertainty as to how extensively state
law was to control, but it made no reference to the provisions in § 36 (c) (1).
Senator Vandenberg later presented an amendment that would have permitted
branch banks in any city not already having a bank, or if the branch would take over
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These amendments became the essence of present section 36 (c) (2),21
while the substance of section 36 (c) (1) was re-enacted without dis.
cussion.22
If the purpose of the 1933 Act was to create competitive equality
between state and national banks, then the rationale of Commercial
Security was correct. Nevertheless, considering that this act created
two subdivisions within section 36 (c), and that exact state standards
were explicitly required by the second, the logical inference is that
Congress did intend different degrees of adherence to state law under
each provision. If the intent were otherwise, section 36 (c) (1) would
serve no purpose. The reference in section 36 (c) (2) to a location
at any point within the state would obviously include a point within
the city of the principal office covered by section 36 (c) (1).
Walker speculates that the reason for stricter adherence to state
law under the second clause is that this provision broke from the
long established policy of limiting national branches to the cities of
the principal office. Thus, it could be expected that branches at
other locations within the state would have to fulfill additional con-
ditions.23 Nevertheless, the authorization for national branches in
the principal office cities was authorized by section 36 (c) (1) only six
years earlier,24 and can hardly be categorized as a long standing
policy.25 A better rationale would be that clause (2) represents a
broader departure from the history of non-branching than clause
(1), and for this reason required greater limitations.
Another equally plausible explanation for this distinction is that
Congress was motivated by the need for extended banking facilities
instead of intending to establish competitive equality between state
and national banks, but realized that oversaturation of a particular
community with new unit banks might eventually have a destruc-
an existing banking facility. 75 CONG. RiE. 9908 (1932); 76 CoNG. Rac. 2206 (1933).
This was withdrawn when the Bratton amendment passed. Id. at 2208.
21 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
22 Senator Wheeler thought that branching should be allowed only in those states
having legislation expressly dealing with the subject. He speculated that where a state
statute was silent on the matter this would be construed as permission for branches.
76 CoNG. Rc. 1997 (1933). To rule out this possibility, the 1933 re-enactment of
clause (1) substituted "expressly authorized" for "permitted" in the McFadden Act.
This alteration indicates that the re-enactment of the first clause with the passage of
§ 36 (c) (2) was not merely an oversight.
28234 F. Supp. at 78-79 n.1l.
24 See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
25 In any event, one would not expect Congress to have felt bound by past policy
during the crucial depression period.
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tive effect on banking competition. 26 The best means of alleviating
the banking service deficiency, therefore, was to allow existing banks
within a city to expand through branch offices. As the problem for
other towns in the state could be handled in the same manner-
by authorizing branches for the banks of that particular town, there
would be less need for branches of banks from another town. This
would explain a more restrictive congressional attitude toward
intra-state branching than intra-city branching.
Although this assumes that the purpose of Congress was to meet
the banking needs of communities, the statute prevents complete
satisfaction of that end by requiring some sort of state authorization.
Since some states forbid branching of any kind27 there may be
areas within those states in need of extended branching services
that, by the terms of the federal and state laws, will be denied branch
banks. The incorporation of state law into section 36 (c), therefore,
would have to be explained in terms of another federal policy. In
the debates prior to the Act of 1933, some concern was expressed
that establishing national branches in all states might infringe upon
the sovereign prerogative of those states which, as manifested in the
state statute, did not desire branch banking. 28 Thus, an intent to
alleviate particular banking service deficiencies was reconciled with
a deference for the states' public policy by incorporating the refer-
ence to state authorization in section 36 (c).29 Nevertheless, the con-
gressional debates and reports, by centering upon the attributes and
disadvantages of branch banking, never discussed the question
whether this means a state's general attitude toward branching or
20 See Comment, 32 U. Ci. L. Rav. 148, 159 (1964).
272 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-63 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.06 (Supp. 1964);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 106 (Smith-Hurd 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.34 (1946);
VERNoN's ANN. CIV. STAT. (Tex.) art. 342-903 (Supp. 1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3131
(1961). In one state the statute is silent as to state branching, Wyo. STAT. ANN. ch. 13,
§§ 13-1 to 13-211 (Supp. 1963), hence branching is not expressly authorized as required
by § 36 (c). See note 22 supra.
Other states which do not authorize branching permit detached drive-in windows
within prescribed distances from the main office. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-340 (Supp.
1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (Supp. 1961); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.107 (Supp.
1964); MoNT. RaV. CODEs ANN. § 5-1028 (Supp. 1963); NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-1, 105 (1962);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 461 (Supp. 1964).
28 See 76 CoNG. REc. 1997 (1933) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
20 Consistent with federal respect for state policy, any change in the banking laws
should be sought from the state legislatures, rather than at the federal level. But see
Comment, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 315, 324-25 (1963). The Utah legislature has ex-
pressly declared continued branch bank operations to be in accordance with the
public policy of that state. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6.1 (Supp. 1963).
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its specific policy toward conditions under which a branch may
exist.80
These cases may be viewed against a broader controversy in
financial circles. Those who urge a permissive policy with regard to
the establishment of national bank branches argue that restrictive
banking regulations discourage initiative and competition, thereby
reducing the economic contributions of banks to the growth of
cities.31 Comptroller of the Currency Saxon contends that the pro-
hibitive power of the states protects monopolies and threatens the
basic structure of the dual banking system.8 2 On the other hand,
small, independent state banks fear an inability to survive the com-
petitive advantage given to larger banks by easing of restrictions on
branching.3 3 While competition may be a stimulus to more progres-
sive and efficient banking practices, it will not fulfill this function
if it effects a decrease in the number of competing unit banks, 84
thus enabling the larger banks to dominate the field.85
80 See Comment, 32 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 148, 159 (1964).
Whether the National Bank Act requires adherence to the narrower policies of
states would have been at issue in Broad Street Trust Co. v. Gidney & Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 2265-5.9, D.D.C., Aug. 15, 1959, discussed in Bell, supra note 4, at
387 n.4, 388-89, where the complainant bank contended that the Comptroller of the
Currency was to follow the same criteria as the state supervisor would in authorizing
branches. However, this case was withdrawn before decision. See also Rushton v.
Michigan Natl Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 437, 299 N.W. 129, 136 (1941), where the
national bank did not have to apply to the state commissioner as required by the state
law. See note 7 supra.
81Sheehan, What's Rocking Those Rocks, the Banks?, Fortune, Oct. 1963, p. 108,
110-11. Banks with branches are said to bc more responsive to population expansion,
in that they draw on the capital resources of a larger area than do single unit banks.
Comment, 38 NoRE DAME LAW. 315, 323 (1963). See WESTEFIELD, op. cit. supra note
10, at 38-39. Harfield, Legal Restraints on Expanding Banking Facilities, Competition
and The Public Interest, 14 Bus. LAw. 1016 (1959) (branches create many possible
sources for deposit); Legislation, 48 HARv. L. Rav. 659, 672 (1935).
82Chicago Daily Tribune, Sept. 25, 1962, § F (Sports.Business), p. 5, col. 1. Mr.
Saxon was apparently fearful of unilateral control by the states over all banking opera.
tions. His critics, however, contend that his policies favor exclusive banking control in
the hands of the federal government. Walker, The Dual Banking System-Its Strengths
and Weaknesses, Banking, Nov. 1962, p. 55, 137 (defense of multi-control of dual
banking structure as system of checks and balances).
-8 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1962, p. 49, col. 1; 75 CoNG. REc. 9981-82 (1932) (remarks
of Senator Norbeck). Contra, Harfield, supra note 31, at 1027 (competition lies in
quality of services to which size of bank is not a decisive factor).
The American Bankers Association has adopted a conservative attitude toward
branch banking and opposes change of the existing banking law. See Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 27, 1962, p. 10, col. 3.
8, Comment, 71 YA~m L.J. 502 (1962) (competition only exists if bank users may
choose among a number of banking institutions).
85 Contra, ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 24 (1954) (while
eliminating competitors, branching would not increase amount of monopoly).
It is suggested that dominance by larger banks is a desirable result if it means that
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In light of the several alternatives and congressional vagueness,
the conflict faced in Walker and Commercial Security cannot be
resolved by resort to congressional intent. There is a strong prob-
ability that future adjudication 6 will entail an undisclosed weigh-
ing of the need for extended national bank services against the fear
of national bank dominance. The situation is clearly ripe for legis-
lative action3 7 which should, inter alia, clarify the primary purpose
of national branching. As the justification for the existence of na-
tional banks is not simply that they provide a form of competition
for state banks, it is submitted that the concern of Congress should
be with the means by which national banks fulfill particular bank-
ing needs.
a strong bank will stand in the place of small, weak banks. Gruis, Antitrust Laws And
Their Application To Banking, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 89, 105 (1955).
40 The appeal of Walker has been docketed in the Tenth Circuit, No. 7981. Letter
from Mr. Robert B. Cartwright, Chief Deputy Clerk for the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
'7 It has been suggested that there is little chance that Congress itself will liberalize
the bank branching law, for such legislation would first have to pass through the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, presently headed by Wright Patman, a strong
opponent of large commercial bank expansion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1962, p. 59, col.
2. See Sheehan, supra note 31, at 246.
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